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Abstract 
Sourcing grapes from independent growers for use in top quality wines sold on the 
international market is a major organisational challenge for corporate wineries. Our paper 
adds to the small existing literature addressing these coordination issues in the New 
World wine sector, by going deeper into the specifics of the contracts, as well as the 
"transaction cost economising" argument. Based on a case-study carried out in the 
Argentine province of Mendoza, this article presents an in-depth analysis of the technical 
process, in order to identify the contractual hazards posed by asset specificity, 
measurement costs, and non-contractible actions. Drawing on contract completion and 
dual sourcing literature, it analyses the contractual and non contractual mechanisms 
(price incentives, grower monitoring, allocation of decision rights to the winery, role of 
backward integration into production) used to govern such grape transactions. Through 
our analysis, we were able to arrive at four main conclusions. Firstly, most agreements 
are still verbal, with the exception of occasional written contracts, limited to a few legal 
provisions. It became clear to us that this approach to forging agreements is not always 
adequate in managing the inherently complex interactions between grape varieties, soil, 
farming practices and wine-making processes in high-end wine production. Secondly, 
extensive decision rights are allocated to wineries, to deal with incompleteness. These are 
key decisions to be taken during the cropping and harvesting process. Thirdly, pricing is 
generally kept flexible, with grape prices negotiated ex-post. This means that trade 
imbalances tend to be resolved in the long term. Winegrowers also benefit from financial 
rewards to compensate for allocations. Finally, any potential opportunistic behaviour by 
wineries with regards to asset specificity (in particular yield limitation) and allocation of 
rights is kept at bay by mechanisms such as winery reputations and credit third-party 
guaranty. This type of behaviour by growers is similarly deterred through monitoring and 
vineyard ownership on the part of the wineries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Much like other food chains, but unlike European viticulture, New World wine chains are 
characterised by large-scale, brand-oriented processing companies alongside small-sized 
independent grape growers. Wineries continuously adapt the wine-making process and 
scope of grape varieties to better meet consumer demand, as well as transferring 
innovations further up in the grape production process. While the central position of the 
winery in the procurement chain makes for fairly efficient marketing, it also raises 
problems of coordination, in particular when securing volumes from independent 
growers, measuring and controlling the quality of the fruit and avoiding conflicts in 
sharing the rent with their suppliers.  
In most supply chains, firms sourcing products from independent suppliers are faced with 
coordination problems. While some of these can be resolved through quality incentive 
contracts, others need the implementation of non-standard contracts and "hybrid" 
organisations such as supply chain systems and inter-organisational networks (Ménard, 
2004, 2012). These governance structures provide incentives, and also play an important 
role in ex-post coordination, because legal contracts are incomplete and need completion 
to foster adaptation, and because cooperation between separate-ownership firms is faced 
with contractual hazards and often results in disputes with high risk of conflict. 
Governance structures thus serve three main objectives: allocating income rights, 
allocating decision rights, and solving conflicts (Hendrikse, 2003).  
In the wine industry, various forms of contracting govern the relationships between grape 
growers and processors. Drawing on specific literature addressing the coordination issues 
in the New World wine sector (Goodhue et al., 2003; Fraser, 2005), we may infer that the 
more complex the quality of the wine, the more incomplete the form of contracting. 
However, most studies do not enter into the specifics of the contract that build upon a 
cautious description of the technical process, and overlook the complementarities that 
may exist between the mechanisms governing each of the transactions handled within a 
winery. Our paper aims to fill these two gaps. It is based on a detailed description of a set 
of large wineries in Argentina that aim to market a wide range of wine categories, 
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including high-end brands. Theoretically, it draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) 
by focusing on the main transactional factors that influence the choice of a governance 
structure, in particular "ease of measurement", uncertainty and asset specificity (Barzel, 
2005; Masten, 2000; Tadelis, 2002; Williamson, 1985). It also goes deeper into the 
efficiency argument, drawing on contract completion (Arrunada et al., 2001, 2005) and 
plural procurement literature (Dutta et al., 1995, Heide, 2003).  
Our paper differs from the previous studies on grape contracts, in the following ways:  
i) Case-study approach to apply the theoretical concepts more efficiently in practice. 
ii) Consideration of the details of the institutional arrangements governing procurement 
and their evolution in the medium term.  
iii) Instead of considering one transaction per firm, our study discriminates between the 
different institutional arrangements that govern transactions within a single winery, and 
looks for complementarities between them, especially those that may exist for top quality 
grapes between vertical integration and incomplete contracts.  
To that purpose, in-depth interviews were conducted during winter 2010, with the senior 
staff of major Argentinean wineries and a sample of their grape suppliers in Mendoza, a 
province of western central Argentina accounting for 80% of the country wine production 
and exports.  
The paper will be organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the coordination issues in the 
production of high-end wines by drawing on literature from the field of organisational 
economics. Special attention is paid to asset specificity, measurement problems, task 
programmability uncertainty, the allocation of decision rights, contract adaptation and 
enforcement, and plural governance. Section 3 provides main facts and figures about 
recent changes in the Argentinean wine industry. Section 4 reports the case-study on 
grape supply management in Mendoza, with a focus on the management of incomplete 
contracts. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES IN THE PRODUCTION OF HIGH-END WINES  
Empirical research into grape contracts stresses that the difficulty in measuring grape 
quality leads to increased non-price coordination and direct control by customers (Fraser, 
2005; Goodhue et al., 2003). Defining a sensorial style - particularly for high-end 
segments - is a critical step for wine producers. High-end wines are characterised by a 
drastic limitation of grape yield and a high interaction between multiple technical 
variables, such as area of production (district, vineyard plot), grape varieties, farming 
practices and wine-making processes. Yield may be reduced by one half or more due to 
extensive pruning. Yield reduction usually takes place at the request of wineries, and is 
designed to improve the quality of the finished product. This activity is a specific asset 
for their grape suppliers, it creates quasi-rent, as well as the potential for the hold-up of 
growers by the wine company.  
The high interaction or strong complementarity between vineyard and winery has 
implications for the organisation of grape sourcing. Contrary to the middle-tier segment 
of "varietal" wines, where wine quality may be approximated by objective criteria such as 
ripeness or colour indexes measured on the grape, quality in the high-end is more 
complex, encompassing characteristics such as aroma concentration, which are not easy 
to produce and measure. Accordingly, it becomes essential for a wine company to 
manage the vineyard decisions which have a significant impact on the final product. This 
may be done through a transfer of decision rights from the grape grower to the firm. 
Transaction costs are therefore mainly derived from the need to protect specific assets 
from partner opportunism, the difficulty of measuring product quality, and the possible 
manipulation of information when allocating decision rights to the buyer for non-
contractible actions.  
After reviewing existing research on wine-grape procurement, we will give insights into 
the three main sources of transaction costs affecting high-end wine (asset specificity, ease 
of measurement, and task programmability uncertainty) and the two governance issues 
(contract design and plural governance) that help to reduce these transaction costs. 
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Previous work on wine-grape procurement 
Empirical literature on grape supply analyses the characteristics of contracts obtained 
through closed questionnaire surveys of growers, focusing on quality incentives (bonus, 
penalty), contractual requirements related to inputs, and farming practices. According to 
these studies, there is a trade-off between output measurement and input control. 
Goodhue et al. (2003) report the results of a postal investigation of 1,277 Californian 
grape producers. The study shows that price incentives for easily-measurable quality 
characteristics at delivery (especially fruit defects and material other than grapes) are less 
frequent in regions with higher priced grapes. In those regions, specific cultural practices 
are more often required or suggested by wineries. The survey of 527 Australian growers 
by Fraser (2005) shows similar results: in low-quality grape-growing regions, farmers are 
motivated by price incentives, based in particular on grape sugar content (potential 
alcohol yield after fermentation) whereas contracts in higher quality regions are 
associated with more frequent vineyard visits by winery staff and more explicit winery 
involvement and direction in vineyard management. A limitation of these two studies is 
that they do not go deeply into the allocation of decision rights to wineries. For example, 
in the econometric specification of Goodhue et al. (2003), "suggested" and "required" 
practices are grouped together. Another limitation is that they focus on contracts only, 
whereas dual sourcing is a key feature in the Californian and Australian wine industry, 
where wineries' own vineyards account for respectively 15% and 21% of supply 
(CDFA/USDA, 2012; Gordon, 2006). 
Our contribution aims to provide an additional perspective on wine grape chain 
organisation. As was the case with a recent study on the Spanish Rioja wine industry 
(Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009), we are interested in the coherence (or alignment) 
between the characteristics of transactions and the governance of grape procurement. 
Based on a survey of 187 wineries, Fernández-Olmos et al. (2009) showed that Rioja 
wineries producing high-quality wines are more likely to integrate vertically than those 
producing lower priced products. Consistent with TCE, growers' physical and dedicated 
assets increase the use of hierarchical governance, whereas the effect of physical asset 
specificity at a winery level is not statistically significant in the model. According to the 
authors, the results support the idea that integration is an efficient means of mitigating 
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potential conflicts under incomplete contracting in the wine industry. One of our previous 
studies also puts forward the role of quality and asset specificity in wineries' choices. 
Drawing on an original survey of 145 French and New World wine brands, we show that 
vertical integration in grape production increases with site, human and physical asset 
specificity e.g. clones, trellising systems, farming practices, vineyard management, and 
contextual knowledge (Rousset, 2006).  
Asset specificity 
According to Williamson (1985), asset specificity is the main source of contractual 
hazards: specific assets are land, material, technical, immaterial, and human assets that 
give a process higher productivity or quality, but have little or no value elsewhere. As 
asset specificity creates quasi-rent and dependence, contractual relationships are subject 
to the hold-up problem, particularly if an opportunistic contracting party acts - or 
threatens to act - in breach of the initial contract (Alchian and Woodward, 1987; Klein et 
al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). Firms are prompted by competition to align governance 
structures with the attributes of the transaction, especially asset specificity (Williamson, 
1985, 1991, 2005). This founding proposition of TCE has been validated by numerous 
empirical studies (Klein, 2005; Macher and Richman, 2008), even if some reviewers are 
more sceptical (David and Han, 2004). Provided that potential hazards are not high 
enough to justify full vertical integration, drafting a long-term supply contract with 
formal agreement on price, volume and certain clauses relating to resolving disputes, 
could mitigate the problem. Nevertheless, the principal limitation of such long-term 
supply contracts is their inflexibility in the face of changing market circumstances 
(Masten and Crocker, 1985; Klein, 1996). From a more general point of view, bounded 
rationality prevents the parties from specifying all contingent clauses.  
Asset specificity has important implications for the organisation of wine-grape 
transactions. Six types of asset specificity have been identified in the literature on grape 
supply (Ayouz et al. 2002; Fraser, 2005; Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009; Traversac et al., 
2011).  
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(a) Temporal specificity is due to the perishable nature of berries and the need to use the 
winery at full capacity during harvest. This asset specificity affects all the categories of 
wine and explains why a minimum of coordination is required for harvesting, 
transporting and receiving grapes.  
(b) Site specificity, which refers to the deployment of assets requiring geographic 
proximity between contracting parties. For instance, it can be generated when a wine 
company sets up in a new area with few grape producers or even farms. The development 
of the Marlborough wine region in New-Zealand in the 1970s is an example of this 
(Lewis et al., 2001).  
(c) Physical specificity, which is induced by physical asset characteristics particularly 
suited to the contractual relationship. Examples of such physical specificity are numerous 
in the industry: investments in drip irrigation to comply with water stress management 
required by a wine company, the planting of new grape varieties, the establishment of a 
specific trellising system (for example, two-divided canopy trellis system).  
(d) Human assets such as professional skills and capabilities are often considered to be 
readily re-deployable in agriculture and viticulture (Masten, 2000; Traversac et al., 2011).  
(e) Brand-name capital such as private brands, trademarks and geographical indications, 
is often seen as important in the wine business. In the EU market, consumers infer a 
higher quality from products with Protected Designation of Origin (PDO). As a result, 
well-established PDOs represent valuable assets for farmers and have to be protected 
(Raynaud et al., 2005; Traversac et al., 2011).  
(f) Dedicated assets, which are implemented to satisfy the other contracting party: these 
assets cause overproduction or underproduction in the event of sudden contract 
breakdown.  
Yield limitation imposed by the buyer with the aim of increasing quality may be 
considered as a dedicated asset. It is undoubtedly one of the most specific assets invested 
by growers supplying high quality grapes. Surprisingly, we are not aware of any paper 
focusing on the role of yield limitation as a dedicated asset. 
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Ease of measurement 
Product quality evaluation plays a crucial role in the organisation of grape procurement. 
Since it is often costly to measure all desirable characteristics (Barzel, 1982, 2005; 
Eggertsson, 1990), buyers and managers have to rely on a limited number of proxies 
(Allen, 1993).  
To understand what is at stake in the quality of wine-grape transactions, one must go back 
to the technical descriptors used in viticulture and oenology research. Marketing or 
branding wine on the basis of a specific sensorial "style" or set of sensorial attributes has 
implications for both the winemaking and grape growing processes. Defining wine style 
is therefore a critical step. Modern oenology identifies two main winemaking strategies.  
Wine brands can be characterised either by standard quality easily identified by 
consumers, or by attributes that give some degree of complexity to the product (Bisson, 
2001a, 2001b).  
A basic strategy is to only target the absence of defects: wines are developed to comply 
with national and intergovernmental regulatory standards, i.e. Codex alimentarius and 
best oenological practices set up by the International Organisation of Vine and Wine 
(Hannin et al., 2006). Standard quality also includes wines that demonstrate a common 
set of characteristics, such as geographical origins or grape variety. For example, the 
"varietal standard" strategy is to produce a wine that expresses the characteristics of a 
certain grape variety, in reference to a global quality benchmark, with standardised 
sensorial characteristics easily identified by consumers (Martin, 2003). Such varietal 
wines are obtained through the blending of grapes from different areas, vinified over a 
short period of 2 to 4 months in stainless steel tanks, and sold in the highly competitive 
premium price band - i.e. between 5 and USD 10. 
Growers producing grapes for premium wines are not required to comply with detailed 
vineyard specifications, but their grapes are evaluated using a quality grid established by 
the winery that highlights essential information for pricing (defects, acidity, soluble 
solids, etc.). Buyers motivate growers with ex-ante incentives: contracted grapes are paid 
with reference to the market (for example, indicative prices quoted by administrative 
district and variety), with bonus and penalty payments for quality achieved (or not) and 
evaluated through the grid. Providing high-powered incentives (Williamson, 1985), these 
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types of contract use measurement (Hueth et al., 1999) as the main coordination 
instrument to foster growers' effort. However, incentive schemes such as this are efficient 
only if effort and quality are strongly correlated (Mahoney, 1992; Hueth and Melkonyan, 
2004). In the low price wine industry, Brix level, total acid and sugar/acid balance at 
delivery are consistent indicators of quality, and there is a good correlation between those 
characteristics and vine practices (yield target, choice of harvest date, etc.). It can 
therefore be said that results-orientated contractual incentives are effective in motivating 
growers.  
In the second winemaking strategy, the brand offers specific flavours that noticeably 
differ from mass-market beverages. The process is based on a specific interaction 
between grape varieties and soil, and the control of both the grape production and wine-
making processes. These high-end wines are therefore characterised by the interaction of 
multiple technical variables, such as the production area (region, district, vineyard, 
parcel), the selection of grape varieties (wines are produced using at least 85% of the 
same grape variety), the farming practices and the winemaking process (requiring 
specific tanks and oak barrels for ageing periods of one year or more).  
Contrary to the basic and premium price segments, quality in the high-end segments 
cannot be achieved through objective measurement alone. A good example is aroma 
concentration, which is difficult to measure in grapes. Even if indicators of aroma 
concentration such as colour have been introduced as a payment tool for some red 
varieties like Shiraz in Australia (Kennedy, 2002), there is still doubt among experts 
about a possible replication of simple or even multi-criteria indicators for high-end wines, 
because of complex and non-linear relations between analytical measurements carried out 
on grapes, and secondary wine flavours. 
Absent objective aroma indicators, two solutions may be used for evaluating high end 
quality and use it for grower payment: bottle pricing and wine tasting. Bottle pricing or 
payment contingent on the price of the final product is currently used by a small minority 
of Californian and Australian wineries (Ligon, 2001; Fraser, 2005). However, this pricing 
scheme, which may be considered as residual claimancy of the winery, exposes the 
grower to moral hazard. Vineyard and winemaking practices are closely connected, and 
have an impact on the sensorial quality of the product, which cannot be evaluated 
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separately. High-end wine segments are thus faced with team production or 
nonseparability issues (Mahoney, 1992; Sykuta, 2005). Ideally, wine tasting could be a 
solution, especially for ultra-premium brands, where separate batch fermentation and 
wine ageing facilitate traceability. While such a measurement device may be useful in 
vertically integrated chains, it proves unsatisfactory as soon as there is a need to contract 
with independent growers. One reason is that wine tasting is a subjective assessment, and 
therefore not legally enforceable. In addition to this, processes carried out in the winery 
may downgrade grape quality from that present at delivery. Another shortcoming of this 
approach is the difficulty in implementing effective traceability, thus making it all but 
impossible to provide appropriate incentives to growers. Given such high measurement 
costs on the final product, the two parties may be better off negotiating winery control 
over some key actions of the grape production process likely to have a significant impact 
on the final product.  
Non-contractible actions  
Long-term contracts with buyer's requirements help to overcome contractual hazards 
associated with difficult-to-measure quality (Jang and Sykuta, 2009). According to 
agency theory, when there is little uncertainty on task programmability and a strong 
correlation between agents' effort and output (Allen and Lueck, 2003; Sykuta, 2005), the 
buyer could theoretically design a complete contract, including production practice rules, 
as in the hog case reported by Jang and Sykuta (2009). However, uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1985), complexity (Masten, 1984; Tadelis, 2002) or low task 
programmability (Mahoney and McNally, 2004) may forego the writing of a complete 
contract with detailed terms covering all possible events.  
In grape production, private rules that are easy to monitor, and may be included as formal 
clauses in a contract, are rules over the use of inputs (rootstock, variety) and rules over 
some farming practices (planting density, trellising, irrigation system). However, due to 
climatic variation and other unforeseen events, not all farming practices that play a 
decisive role in high-end wine quality can be planned in advance and specified in a 
written contract. A good example of a vineyard practice that has to be adjusted at short 
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notice is cluster thinning in summertime, which accelerates ripening and improves the 
quality of the grapes, while reducing yield.  
In such a context, the rights that cannot be specified in a contract may be allocated to one 
of the partners in order to reduce transaction costs (Barzel, 2005; Arrunada, 2005). 
However, the allocation of rights leads to the possibility of opportunistic behaviour on the 
part of the principal. As a result, the agent accepts to transfer rights if he is granted 
monetary advantages, and can benefit from efficient private enforcement mechanisms, 
such social norms, relational trust, or reputation. The rights over non contractible actions 
may be called residual rights or economic rights as opposed to the specific or legal rights 
that may be included as a formal clause in a contract (Demsetz, 1998; Barzel, 2002). 
Hence, a complete contract only includes specific rights, whereas an incomplete contract 
provides large scope for residual rights. Hu and Hendrikse (2009) conducted a multiple 
case-study of Chinese fruit and vegetable companies, where buyers are allocated decision 
rights over the use of inputs (specified seeds, fertiliser or pesticide), cultural and post-
harvest practices, and monitoring rights such as direct inspection of farmers. The authors 
suggest that the number of decision rights increases with product quality, consistent with 
the hypothesis that an allocation of decision rights also helps mitigate agents' 
opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, they show that the granting of extensive decision 
rights to the buyer exposes the growers to a large risk of expropriation, with the main 
safeguard against the abuse of power being the buyer's reputation. 
The transfer of authority over vineyard practices to the winery reduces the costs of 
adaptation and allows the implementation of best practices for quality management
1
. This 
transfer is voluntary, and negotiated for the duration of the contract. During the growing 
season, winery staff regularly visit grape producers under contract. These technicians 
have the authority to monitor growers and oversee the day-to-day use of farm inputs 
and/or good cultural practices, contributing to the improvement of vineyard management 
and the production of grapes tailored to the winery’s needs.  
 
                                                 
1
 To our knowledge, there is no empirical research in the wine sector dealing with the allocation 
of decision rights to the buyer. 
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Governance structures 
Transactions of agricultural products are embedded in governance structures, which range 
from market governance to hybrids organisations, where firms pool resources without 
being integrated into a single command (see the synthesis of Ménard, 2012). According 
to Hendrikse (2003), governance structures serve three main objectives: allocating 
income rights, allocating decision rights (or authority) and solving conflicts. In addition 
to providing incentives, they play a decision role in adaptation, because legal contracts 
are incomplete. 
(i) Allocating income rights: This consists of defining the distribution of costs and 
revenues between partners, while limiting adverse selection and moral hazard, in 
particular thanks to incentive-compatible pricing (Hendrikse, 2003). For instance, in 
agricultural contracts, payment can be non-differentiated (commodity pricing), flat-rate 
(par acre payment) or cost-plus; it may conversely provide stronger incentives, with 
residual claimancy or quality contingent payment. 
(ii) Allocating decision rights: To cope with unforeseen events, parties should either 
promise to act in "good faith" or allocate residual rights to one party (Hviid, 2000). In a 
seminal study, Maccaulay (1963) argues that businessmen often do not plan every future 
event in legally binding contracts, but rather fill the gap with informal relationships, 
bringing into play trust, reputation, the repetition of transactions, and norms of 
reciprocity, adjusting exchanges by mutual agreement, and settling disputes by 
negotiation. In relational governance, contracting is not merely about enforcing state-
contingent claims, but also putting in place rules to govern the relationship over the long 
term (Eccles, 1981; Goldberg, 1976). Poppo and Zenger (2002) operationalise relational 
governance with four underlying dimensions: open communication and sharing of 
information, trust, dependence and cooperation.  
Ménard (2012) emphasises the role of authority in exercising control over and instilling 
discipline in the members of hybrid organisations such as cooperatives, franchises, 
supplier parks, or strategic alliances. Authority is only exerted on a limited subset of 
rights, and because it is based on mutual consent, authority is different from the 
hierarchical relationship within a firm, and maintains symmetry between partners. 
However, authority can also be imbalanced: in subcontracting, one firm (the contractor) 
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often has extended decision rights to adapt the contract (Ménard, 2012).  
(iii) Solving conflicts and enforcing promises: The cooperation between separate-
ownership firms naturally carries hazards and a potential for disputes, especially in 
complex and developing environments. To enforce their agreements, it is rational for 
parties to take advantage of more than one enforcer, each enforcing the components of 
the agreement for which it enjoys a comparative advantage. The contractual part of an 
agreement is enforced by the State, and deals with objectively measurable and verifiable 
commitments; the non-legal part, enforced by reputation (calculative trust) or by norms 
of obligation and cooperation, deals with attributes that are costly to measure at the time a 
transaction takes place (Barzel, 2005).  
Non-legal mechanisms such as reputation or private arbitration can help to overcome 
critical problems of non-verifiability for certain characteristics of agricultural 
transactions. Indeed, new investigations within organisational economics have proved the 
very important role of reputation as an alternative mechanism to vertical integration in 
the presence of contractual non-fulfilment and asset specificity (Baker et al., 2002). 
According to Maccaulay (1963), even when there is room for opportunistic behaviour, 
the promises to act in "good faith" may be enforced by social norms, reputation and the 
exchange of hostages. The reputation mechanism works well in small groups, where low 
information costs and cultural homogeneity encourage retaliation and black-listing, with 
a real risk of losing future business. Indeed, the enforcement of commercial agreements 
in merchant communities has been extensively studied (for a survey see Richman 2004). 
In larger professional groups, deterring misbehaviour while limiting transaction costs 
often requires formal private institutions to act as third-party enforcers, gathering 
evidence and punishing those who act dishonestly (Greif et al., 1994). 
There is no consensus in literature on whether public (legal) and private enforcement 
devices are substitutable or complementary. Substitutability is supported by those who 
show that well-specified contracts undermine the capacity to develop informal 
agreements and inter-firm trust (Maccaulay, 1963; Palay, 1985), or that firms sometimes 
rely on private ordering simply because there is no effective law or no confidence in the 
judicial system to settle disputes (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Conversely, 
complementarity is argued by scholars who assert that a joint use of formal and informal 
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arrangements allows better enforcement of commitments (Lazzarini et al., 2004) or that 
formal contracts embedded in relational governance narrow the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour and increase punishments (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Likewise, Klein (1996) 
gives insights into the "self-enforcing range" of contracts by demonstrating that the 
private enforcement capital of firms (i.e. their capacity to impose sanctions by threatening 
to terminate the relation or to damage the other firm’s reputation) defines the extent to 
which parties honour their commitments, without cheating when external conditions 
change (for an application in agri-food, see Mazé and Ménard, 2010). 
In the quality wine industry, incomplete grape contracts combine explicit court-enforced 
terms (varietal, volume, exclusive dealing, and legalistic "force majeure" clauses) and 
self-enforcing relational clauses: required farming practices, the right of the winery to 
choose harvest timing, and often pricing. In developed institutional environments like the 
Champagne wine industry, parties may complement these two devices with third-party 
enforcement embedded in a regulatory framework (Lanotte and Traversac, 2011). 
Plural governance 
In the high-end segment, wine producers will often mix grapes obtained from their own 
vines with those bought in from third-party growers.  
Literature on plural (or dual) forms of distribution and procurement has developed in 
activities such as industrial distribution (Dutta et al, 1995), restaurant chains (Bradach, 
1997), haulage companies (He and Nickerson, 2006), the purchasing of component by 
equipment manufacturers (Heide, 2003) or the procurement of raw material by metal 
forming companies (Parmigiani, 2007). Four explanations are consistently found in this 
literature, which appears somehow to contradict the "discrete alignment" hypothesis of 
TCE (Williamson, 1991).  
i) Shifting risk: The traditional explanation is that facing demand uncertainty, integrated 
firms are willing to ensure full internal capacity and stable production, and transfer the 
fluctuations in volume to subcontractors (Adelman, 1949, quoted by Parmigiani, 2007).  
ii) Solving information asymmetries: According to agency theory, internal production 
helps monitor distributors or suppliers. In a context of performance ambiguity, the 
integration of sales force (house account) allows for better monitoring of the actions of 
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representatives, and provides benchmarking (Dutta et al., 1995). According to Heide 
(2003), in-house expertise reduces adverse selection by improving the ability to assess 
suppliers' characteristics, and mitigates moral hazard in contracting by designing more 
efficient systems of behaviour control. 
iii) Ratcheting: The two governance structures have different capabilities and incentives 
properties, and this is a source of synergy and organisational efficiency. In a study of fast-
food chains, Bradach (1997) analyses the ratcheting effect, in which the performance of 
one arrangement is used to set the standard of the other, in a continuous dynamic process. 
He also shows how the plural form builds on the mutual learning process between the 
company and its franchisees, the former providing formal expertise, procedures and the 
management of information systems, and the latter a knowledge of local market 
conditions and ideas for new strategies. 
iii) Reducing transaction costs: An empirical study on industrial purchasing (Heide, 
2003) shows that the interaction between asset specificity and external uncertainty 
increases the likelihood of a plural form rather than unique market governance. One 
explanation is that an in-house operation enhances the ability of manufacturers to adapt in 
the supplier relationship, when it is difficult to write complete contracts. 
Existing literature gives few predictions about real-world governance in the wine 
industry, because the benefits of the plural form (better monitoring and ratcheting of the 
supplier) do not require a high degree of vertical integration. For many large-scale wine 
producers, forty or fifty hectares is sufficient. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
wine giants such as Ernest and Julio Gallo and Constellation Brands are still producing a 
few percent of there lower-priced grapes in-house. The TCE explanation (providing 
credible threat to enforce incomplete contracts) has a better discriminatory power, in a 
sense that high-quality production has to deal with high uncertainty and non-verifiability; 
however, it ultimately depends on the extent of asset specificity. 
To summarise this section (Figure 1), wineries looking to produce high-end wines need to 
manage complex interactions between grape varieties, soil, farming practices, and wine-
making and ageing processes. As a result of this, when procuring grapes from 
independent growers, wineries face high measurement costs and cannot rely only on 
proxies of product quality as is the case with wines in lower price categories. Input 
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control and grower monitoring are therefore the two main coordination instruments. 
However, because of uncertainty and non contractible actions, contracts are left 
incomplete, with allocation of control rights to the technicians of the winery and room for 
adaptation during the growing season. 
 
Figure 1. Organisational issues in wine-grape procurement: summary. 
Issues Basic and premium 
varietal wines 
Super/ultra premium 
wines 
Coordination 
problems 
Asset specificity Low  High (yield limitation 
in particular) 
Difficulty in 
measuring  product 
quality  
Low  High 
Task programmability 
uncertainty 
Low   High 
Coordination 
instruments 
Residual claimancy  Some evidence (bottle 
pricing) 
Measurement Use of proxies 
(ripeness indicators) 
 
Input control Variety, sometimes 
trellising system 
Variety, parcel, 
trellising system, 
pruning (buds/cluster 
density), canopy 
management 
Monitoring  Frequent visits 
Governance  
structures 
Income rights Market price Guaranteed price 
(floor/window 
formula, cost plus), or 
negotiated price 
Decision rights No allocation to the 
winery 
Allocation for a wide 
range of cultural 
practices 
Enforcement rights Termination at will Monitoring  
Reputation 
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3. THE ARGENTINEAN WINE INDUSTRY 
3.1. Recent changes in Argentina 
Argentina is a country of great interest for the study of coordination in the wine industry. 
In 2011, the country was ranked 9th in terms of vineyard area (217,750 hectares, 2.9 
percent of the total worldwide area), 8th for grape production, 5
th
 for wine production 
(15.5 Mhl, 5.8%), and 9
th
 for wine export by volume (3.1 Mhl, 3.2% of worldwide 
production and a quarter of the national production). There are 24,780 vineyards in 
Argentina, with wines produced by 974 wineries, and exported by 477 different 
companies (Source: Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura, 2012).  
Starting in the 1990s, many foreign companies recognised the potential of Argentine 
wine-growing regions, and invested heavily in the cultivation of high-end grape varieties 
in the country. This new investment, accompanied by the construction of modern bodegas 
(wineries), represented a significant change in the industry. Before long, local investors 
also began to inject money into their national wine market. This combination of new 
developments was supported by an economically stable Argentine economy in the 1990s. 
Between 1991 and 2001, there was high investment in the Argentine wine business, with 
500 million USD of domestic investment, and one billion USD from overseas (Stein, 
2008). A good example of the situation at that time is the Tupungato winelands project in 
the Uco valley, where 10,000 hectares of irrigated vineyards were installed. The 
economic policy implemented according to the "Mendoza-San-Juan Agreement "in 1995, 
contributed to a stabilisation of wine supply, and a gradual increase in prices. Despite the 
economic crisis of 2001, development remained unaffected, mainly due to devaluation of 
the peso and the resulting fall in labour costs. As a result, Argentina was able to continue 
producing good quality, value-for-money wines.  
The cornerstone of this flourishing new wine business was a continuous striving to 
improve grape quality. This was achieved through a variety of methods, including 
modification of water management (introduction of drip irrigation, targeting a moderate 
water deficit), trellising systems (from the traditional pergola to modern canopy 
management), the use of successful varieties (Vinifera) grafted on Phylloxera resistant 
rootstocks, and the introduction of nets to protect vines from hailstone. Another part of 
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this quality-driven development was the modernisation of wine-making equipment in 
bodegas throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Vineyard staff also benefited from enhanced 
training, with external oenologists and technicians being brought in to share their 
expertise. The upshot of all these developments was a greater focus on the export market, 
particularly for premium and top-of-the-range wines.  
At the same time, marketing strategies were devised to target a new generation of wine 
consumers, namely those from countries not previously associated with high day-to-day 
wine consumption. These new wine drinkers, who appreciated unpretentious, easy-
drinking beverages, were a key factor in the success of Argentine wines. Alongside these 
new, easily accessible wines, Argentina also became known as a producer of fine wines, 
especially those made from the Malbec grape variety. As shown in figure 2, export 
figures sky-rocketed from the late 1990s onwards. The great majority of wines exported 
in 2011 (68%) were made from international varietals such as Chardonnay, Cabernet 
Sauvignon, or Malbec (Source: INV, 2012). 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of wines and concentrated must exports between 1990 and 2008. 
 
Source: INV, Statistical synthesis 1991-2008. 
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Despite far-reaching changes in Argentine vineyards over the last two decades, the 
majority of the vinestock is fairly old, with a large amount of common local vines 
(criollas). These grapes are mainly used to supply the domestic market, which still 
accounts for three quarters of all consumption of Argentine wine. Wines marketed within 
Argentina are generally less expensive, and tend to be sold without any indication of the 
grape variety, as well as being of a lower quality (in 2011, 65% of wines were sold 
without varietal labelling).  
It is therefore possible to identify two key types of wine production: on one hand there is 
the basic wine production, aimed at the domestic market, and on the other hand there are 
the premium and high-end labels. The latter category is generally produced by the most 
modern bodegas, who have either recently opened, or have the necessary financial means 
to adapt their production methods. Basic wines are predominantly made by large 
companies or cooperative cellars, who buy in grapes from small private growers without 
the means to re-plant their vine stock. The key to the success of this market are low 
production costs, which can only be maintained by adopting a bulk-processing approach 
to winemaking (Van den Bosch and Vitale, 2010). 
3.2. The Mendoza wine supply chain  
The biggest Argentine wine-producing area is Mendoza, which produces over 67% of 
domestic wines, and is responsible for 80% of exports. In 2009, the region had 160,704 
hectares under vine, 16,983 growers, and 682 wineries, out of a total of 952 for the whole 
country. In the same year, Mendoza produced 8.6 million hectolitres of wine and 2.5 
million hectolitres of concentrated must. Mendoza vineyards are mainly located in the 
northern oasis, which was also one of Argentina's first ever wine-growing areas (Van den 
Bosch, 2008). Most of the bodegas are also located in this part of the region, along with a 
number of bottling companies, to cater for those wine estates without their own bottling 
facilities.  
In the basic wine sub-sector, there are different highly-specialised stakeholders, which 
create a fragmented agri-food chain. On one hand, there is a network of cooperatives, the 
Federación of Cooperativas Vitivinícolas Argentinas (FECOVITA), with their affiliated 
growers, and on the other hand there are the independent growers, who sell their grapes 
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to private bodegas. These companies in turn have their own set of characteristics. Some 
produce, bottle, and brand their own wine, whereas others do not have the facility to do 
so. These lesser-equipped producers, referred to as "trasladistas" (Van den Bosch and 
Vitale, 2010), export wine in bulk or sell it to factories for bottling.  
Grape growers have access to a "terceros" system, or third-party wine production, 
whereby their grapes are provided to a bodega, who will make the wine under the 
grower's own name. With this arrangement, the grower can either choose to sell the wine 
themselves, or sell it directly bodega providing the vinification service. The latter 
represents the most common chain of events (Lumbroso, 2010).  
The quality wine chain (over 5 USD per bottle) has a simpler vertical organisation. This 
subsector represents approximately 3,000 grape growers and 250 wineries, with or 
without their own vineyards. For the wineries, the first category to be distinguished is that 
of the large, forward-integrated estates who produce and bottle their wine in-house. These 
producers tend to fall into the middle price bracket (5-10 USD per bottle) and are very 
competitive with their pricing strategies. In Mendoza, there are six main companies of 
this type: Santa Ana, Cavas de Santa María, Michel Torino, Orfila, La Riojana, and 
Covisan. Most of their wine is sold to mass-market customers such as supermarkets and 
retail chains. The other types of bodega are those with integrated production, but without 
on-site bottling facilities. These estates externalise packaging or use mobile bottling 
services, with which they can bottle and package their wines on site, and prepare them for 
bulk export. Within this category, three types of companies can be identified:  
i) Large companies, which have their own vineyards, and also source grapes from 
independent growers. They market wines in bottles or in bulk, under their own brand or 
that of a distributor, and also work with the domestic hotel and catering market.   
ii) Former cooperatives and bodegas trasladistas who have shifted their focus towards 
higher-quality wines. They export their products in bulk or in bottles, mostly as 
supermarket own-brand wines.  
iii) Bodegas dedicated to small-scale production (bodegas boutiques). These producers 
exclusively use grapes from their own vineyards. The development of producers such as 
these is closely connected to wine tourism, as their "rustic" image is appealing to visitors. 
Most of their wine is sold directly to consumers, or through the restaurant trade.  
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The bodegas of Mendoza can secure grape sourcing in three different ways, either from 
their own vineyards, from independent growers, or as a terceros service provider. Figures 
on these three grape sourcing methods have varied over the years. In 2009, grapes 
obtained by bodegas from their own vineyards accounted for 36% of total production, 
with the remaining 64% supplied by independent growers, 33% of which was through the 
terceros system. However, statistics were quite different for premium grapes, 62% of 
which are grown "in house". The amount vinified under terceros agreements is negligible 
(Van den Bosch and Vitale, 2010). 
To understand the quality improvement process, it is important to examine the design of 
grape supply contracts, particularly as it applies to the relationships between large 
companies and small-scale growers producing premium grapes.  
4. GRAPE SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IN ARGENTINA 
The case study is based on semi-structured interviews conducted in early 2010 with the 
senior management and field staff of seven Mendoza wineries, as well as some of their 
grape suppliers (Lumbroso, 2010). Follow up was carried out via email. In the interest of 
confidentiality, no winery is mentioned by name.  
The main subject of our study was one of the main bodegas in Mendoza, which for the 
purposes of this report will be referred to as Bodega Campos (BC). As a subsidiary of a 
leading global beverage company, BC is a market leader in the sale of still and sparkling 
wines. Having operated in Argentina for over fifty years, the company decided to make a 
foray into the export sector, producing high-quality wines to sell around the world. For 
several years now, BC has been working with a famous French Bordeaux wine producer 
on an icon wine priced at 50 USD per bottle.  
4.1. Vineyard selection 
Every wine produced by BC requires different grapes. Classification of grapes by the 
bodega reflects their quality, but above all their target market. The choice of grapes and 
resulting characteristics are determined by the required wine style. For example, if the 
goal is to produce an easy-drinking wine, less concentrated grapes will be selected.  
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Grapes are divided into grades. They are initially sorted into those destined for use in still 
wines, and those intended for sparkling wines. The latter are placed into a single category, 
known as grade E. The distinction between these grapes is made at the zone level, with 
the potential of every plot of land being known as well as the usual destination of its 
grapes. For still wines, there are five different categories of grapes, which correspond to 
the five ranges of wines produced by the bodega. Each category of wine has its own 
specific quality targets for grape quality, requiring a particular type of work for each class 
of vineyard. The lowest categories correspond to grapes which are relatively easy to 
obtain. Higher quality wines demand very particular types of grapes, which by definition 
are harder to come by, as their cultivation is much more technically demanding. 
The bodega procures grapes both from its own vineyards and from independent growers. 
Every year, BC's commercial department adjusts its multiannual plan of sales and 
transmits it to the winemaking department. The plan is converted into volumes for each 
category of wine, and then into volumes for each category of grapes according to the 
rules of blending specific to each category of wine. Volumes of grapes for the next 
growing season are approved by the vineyard department, who predict the amount of 
grapes that will be obtained in-house, and the amount that will need to be purchased from 
outside growers.  
Initially, BC classifies grape growers into quality groups, from E (lowest grade) to A 
(highest grade). This ranking is calculated using an evaluation report from company 
technicians. For newcomers, the report deals with "signal" variables. Grape suppliers are 
chosen based on grape varieties, the homogeneity of their vineyards, canopy system, and 
sanitary condition, which are prerequisite. Then the classification depends on a vineyard's 
specific potential (climatic zone, soil, vineyard management). Elements taken into 
account when assessing existing suppliers include loyalty and past performance. 
The final classification of grapes is decided through negotiations with growers, and 
depends greatly on the kind of vineyards practices that a particular grower agrees to 
implement.  The higher the category, the more demanding the vineyard practices (vine 
pruning, bunch thinning, canopy management, deficit irrigation, etc.). In practice, BC 
does not monitor all its producers the same way. More attention is paid to newcomers, 
growers changing category or growing grapes for the more demanding wines. Of course, 
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technicians' knowledge of vineyard potential and grower or manager practices increases 
with time for regular suppliers. 
In the low and middle price bands, growers receive monetary incentives based on easily 
measurable variables. BC obtains the vast majority of their supply of local grape varieties 
(criollas) through the spot market or other wineries. For premium (C and D) varieties, 
short-term verbal contracts tend to be agreed. 
For high-end production (A and B grades), the winery favours a more centralised 
governance, with vertical integration and incomplete contracts embedded in long-term 
relationships. Decision and control rights over a set of vineyard practices are negotiated 
and voluntarily transferred to BC for the duration of the contract.  During the growing 
season, winery staff have authority over the day-to-day use of grape farm inputs and 
strategic cultural practices. Contracts are however still mostly verbal with an assumed 
yearly renewal of these agreements. Even written contracts are kept very simple and 
incomplete; for those contracts, private enforcement is therefore a central issue.  
4.2. Lower-priced wines: quality incentive contracts 
BC manages grape quality for low and middle tier segments with contractual incentives, 
through the use of credible signals and contractual monetary incentives (price premium). 
Signal variables reduce information asymmetry, provide the bodega with a good 
opportunity to define the vineyard potential for quality, and help define groups of 
producers for each segment. The buyer relies predominantly on short-term oral contracts 
for premium varietal wines. Duration is not clarified, but the verbal commitment 
generally runs for one crop year. Moreover, no yield restriction is imposed on the grower. 
Companies benefit from competition among grape producers, and use the "market price" 
for payment. The market price is area and variety specific, and based on the previous 
year's grape prices, as reported by the regional Board of trade (Bolsa de Comercio de 
Mendoza). For instance, a generic Cabernet Sauvignon grape from the Maipù area will 
not require any particular specification. A price premium - which may increase the market 
price by up to 20% - is granted according to the score obtained from the grid-based 
evaluation at different stages of the production cycle (protocolo). The grid includes 
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weighted values relating to vineyard quality, harvest quality, and sanitary state. It 
combines various criteria, each of which are given a score out of ten (Figure 3).  
Vineyard monitoring serves to assess potential grape quality, and whether particular 
grapes belong in the category to which they have been assigned (it is important to 
estimate the sanitary quality of both grapes and vineyards, because even if a vineyard is 
contaminated by a fungal disease or parasite, the grower may have selected the healthiest 
clusters for harvest testing).  
Figure 3. Example of a quality evaluation grid. 
Quality Checkpoint Percentage 
of overall 
score 
Measurements (1-10) 
Vineyard 
 
Vineyard -  inspection 
during growing season 
45% Vineyard homogeneity, 
canopy balance, sanitary 
state 
Harvest quality Checks at time of 
delivery 
20% Quality of harvest box 
stacking, mud residue 
inside and outside boxes, 
grape integrity, leaf 
fragments 
Sanitary state Checks at time of 
delivery 
35% Fungal damage (Powdery 
mildew, downy mildew, 
rot), hail 
Source: interviews with BC. 
 
BC has been using the same grape evaluation system for over twenty years. Scores 
obtained through this system are generally good, with 90% of producers achieving eight 
to ten out of ten. A secondary effect of this method of evaluation is that most grape 
growers have now changed their methods to ensure they obtain a satisfactory rating. The 
standards expected by BC of their growers are widely known, even among new 
contractors. Disputes are rare, because the rules are clearly understood by all parties. 
However, occasional disagreements do occur vineyards classification, where a grower 
considers their grapes to be worthy of a higher category than that assessed by BC's staff.  
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4.3. High-end brands: incomplete contracts 
For super and ultrapremium wines, grapes from different plots are crushed separately, and 
their must is vatted in different tanks. To procure fruit, BC relies on vertical integration 
and incomplete contracts embedded in long term relationships.  
Suppliers must agree to frequent, unannounced visits from representatives of the 
company, and must also keep detailed records of their growing practices, particularly 
those involving the use of chemicals. In certain cases, the company may even supply or 
require the use of specific brands of pesticide. The frequency of these visits depends 
largely on the characteristics of the grapes. If the variety being grown is very technically 
demanding, there will be greater supervision. The skill and experience of different 
growers are also taken into account. Inspections tend to target new suppliers, or those 
who have performed poorly in the past. 
Fruit evaluation on vineyard help determine an optimal date of harvest for each parcel 
and fixing a delivery date for growers. As the harvest time draws closer, more frequent 
visits are made to give BC an idea of the maturity of that year's grapes. Harvest and 
delivery dates are determined based on refractometry and berry tasting.  
There are two types of formalisation to frame the relationship between the bodega and its 
external grape growers: written and verbal agreements. The latter is still the most 
common type of agreement, despite pressure on the technical director from the legal 
department to increase the use of written contracts. These formal contracts tend to be 
used only when dealing with producers of the highest quality grapes. At the time of 
publication, a mere nineteen written contracts had been signed.  
Contracting begins with the bodega telling the grower the volume and type of grapes it 
wishes to buy. These details are generally agreed early on in the production cycle, at the 
latest before pruning, as yield limitation is a key operational factor. The exact price is not 
fixed in advance, but negotiated after harvesting
2
.  
                                                 
2
 While pricing is generally per ton and kept flexible, there is also a system of fixed pricing per 
hectare, used by several interviewed bodegas, including BC, in very strategic cases. It is a strong 
guaranty of quality for the winery as it neutralized grower's trade-off between yield and quality; 
at the same time, it provides insurance for the grower, shifting risk to the winery. For example, in 
case of problems of flower abortion (coulure), the bodega will receive fewer grapes, while paying 
the same price. However, in case of hail, the contract of BC includes a clause according to which 
the percentage of lost production is deducted from the price normally paid by hectare. For 
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Written contracts are quite short (three pages) and allocate extended residual rights to the 
bodega (Figure 4). The key elements of the contract are duration of the contract, volume 
and variety of grapes, size of parcels, action to be taken in the event of an accident, or 
sale of the vineyard, enforceable non-compliance.  
Figure 4. Written contract for high quality grapes. 
Specific rights Residual rights  
(allocated to buyer) 
Duration: five years. 
Full delivery of grapes with expected 
volumes estimated by multiplying surface 
by expected yield. 
Price: to be fixed in the upper quartile of the 
market price established for a given 
region/area, variety, trellising system, yield 
under constraint; assumes that requested 
activities have been carried out and takes 
into account the quality criteria. 
Costs: harvesting (if done by the winery) 
and transport to the winery to be paid by the 
grower. Responsibility of the seller for all 
vineyard labour costs, including activities 
requested by the buyer.  
Mode of payment: 30% in May, 70% in 
equal staggered payments until the end of 
the year. Where credit has been given at 
harvesting, the advance is deducted from the 
first 30% payment. 
Penalty (in case of breach contract): 3 
tonnes/ha valued at the price above, to be 
paid by the defaulting party every remaining 
year of the contract. 
Enforcement institution: provincial court 
of justice. 
Activities to be carried out in the vineyard 
at request of the winery:  
 Pruning.  
 Removing root sprouts (uprooting).  
 Leaf and cluster thinning during 
summertime if necessary.  
 Application of pesticides. 
 Irrigation. 
Harvesting date and place to be fixed by the 
winery. 
Rights to be bilaterally negotiated 
Extension of the duration of the contract. 
Harvesting and shipping costs. 
Frequency of inspection visits. 
Source: BC's written contract. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
example, if 50 % of the production is lost, the price will be decreased in half on the remaining 
production. But it remains little advantageous for the bodega, because the rest of grapes also lost 
in quality because of the hail. Besides, some producers could have incentives to not fertilize 
because they have no interest to reach higher yield. 
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More interestingly, the contract also requires that producers make a commitment "to 
respect the decisions of the bodega as regards the works in the vineyard", that the bodega 
chooses the date of the grape harvest, that the per tonne price will be negotiated every 
year, in reference to a "market price", in the "upper quartile" for similar grapes if the 
producer respects the requirements of the bodega.  The contract is thus left incomplete, 
with room for change during the growing season (this is not the case for quality incentive 
contracts, where the grower keeps all the residual decision and control rights) and flexible 
pricing.  
Each grape category commands a different price range, taking into account the extra costs 
inherent in the development of high quality grapes, in particular the costs associated with 
yield limitation. Each grade also implies a different allocation of decision rights to the 
winery. Some contractual elements may be adjusted on a yearly basis. This is the case of 
some decision rights which may be allocated differently to the winery.  
Pricing is another fundamental point of contract adaptation. The written contract does not 
include any type of price formula (target, ceilings, windows or cost-plus pricing 
formula)
3
. It only specifies that payment will be made according to the variety, region and 
quality in the upper quartile of the "market price", with an implicit reference to the 
information provided by the Bolsa de Comercio de Mendoza. However, the Board of 
Trade only considers the broad "premium" category for quality grapes, and does not 
report weekly or monthly prices for grapes, only annual figures.  
To improve their bargaining position in price negotiations, growers are left to rely on 
hearsay about prices obtained from other bodegas, or have to use prices of winery to 
winery transactions published every week by the Board of Trade. As price is negotiated 
ex-post (after harvest) with only rough cues about market prices, one could think that the 
grower has little power of negotiation, and is exposed to high risk of moral hazard. 
However, there are very few conflicts. Indeed, both parties almost always come to an 
agreement, especially since the grower and the bodega have a mutual interest in 
maintaining stable long-term relations. Contractors do not think in terms of a one-shot 
                                                 
3
 Formal price indexation formulas are sometimes used for long term contracts in the wine 
industry, for example Montaigne and Sidlovits (2003) document the case of a large French wine 
company that offers a formal contract with stability and protection against too important price 
fluctuations on the input, as well as on the consumer markets. 
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transaction, but rather of a repeated negotiation over several years. If negotiations were 
one-off occurrences, it would be easy for the buyer to pay an absurdly low price.  
Keeping pricing flexible is crucial in Mendoza, where inflation and monetary fluctuations 
entail strong variations in wine prices and input costs. In grape transactions, the objective 
is to negotiate a "fair price", so that the losses or the profits experienced by all parties 
balance out over the years. One of the interviewees pointed out that fixing prices in 
advance (as in certain contracts in California) increases tensions between parties, and 
may lead to contract termination. The trading imbalances that could appear because of the 
market situation are compensated over the long term, with a "shared belief" of fair 
income distribution (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). However, while such expectations 
undoubtedly help to reduce disputes over rent sharing, other private devices are used to 
make incomplete contracts self-enforcing. 
4.4. Enforcement 
To enforce agreements, BC and their growers rely on five non legal mechanisms: (i) exit 
option, (ii) group assignment, (iii) reputation capital, (iv) hostages, and (v) competitive 
sourcing. For the middle tier wine category, only the first two mechanisms matter, 
whereas for high-quality wines, they are not effective, and the other three become 
important. 
(i) Exit option: Prices are negotiated weeks and sometimes months after delivery and 
processing by the winery. Growers' low bargaining power is reinforced by the option to 
unilaterally break the contract if the negotiation is unsuccessful, a right tacitly 
acknowledged in Mendoza (even if generally, it is not exercised). In that case, the grapes 
are returned to the grower in the form of unfinished (non-aged) wine. The grower is also 
required to pay a fixed charge for processing. The product could then be sold on the wine 
market, with a good chance of fetching the market price reported for similar types of 
product (varietal, region, vintage). In the high-end tier, however, this option is ineffective 
in providing safeguards, because switching from the contractor to the spot market incurs 
losses. With specific sensorial characteristics, there are high search and transaction costs, 
no guarantee of finding a good match on the market, and a strong probability of not 
recovering specific investments (yield limitation) and extra costs (required practices). 
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(ii) Group assignment: Price negotiations are framed by the use of grape quality groups, 
because there is the guarantee that growers will stay in a given group for a year, and be 
paid accordingly. At the high end of the spectrum, with no information on the market 
price for top quality grapes, this is largely ineffective. 
(iii) Reputation capital: BC is a well established company in Argentina, with a reputation 
backed by its affiliation to a multinational wine and spirits company, and by relational 
investments with local growers such as training sessions, social events and funding of 
children's schooling. 
(iv) Hostages: The Fondo Provincial de Transformación y Crecimiento de Mendoza, a 
public institution for credit and agricultural development, subsidises anti-hail nets for 
small-scale growers, on the condition that they have a third-party guarantor. In practice, 
this guarantee is generally provided by the bodega with which they have the strongest 
business relationship. Because of this, the company has a vested interested in the grape 
producer's success. By providing guarantees such as this, BC and fellow wineries 
construct long-lasting relationships with their contracting growers, and credibly commit 
to treat them fairly in business dealings. 
 (v) Dual sourcing: In Mendoza, wineries source on average 62% of all varietal grapes 
from their own vineyards (Van den Bosch and Vitale, 2010). This figure is even higher at 
BC for grade A and B grapes - those dedicated to ultra-premium brands. Vertical 
integration re-establishes termination as a credible sanction in case of growers' 
misbehaviour or opportunism. The complementarity between governance structures is 
especially helpful in enforcing incomplete contracts, and has in our opinion been 
overlooked in previous empirical literature on wine-grape transactions.  
However, if vineyard ownership helps to make incomplete contracts self-enforcing, it is 
not justified by this unique factor. Other drivers, such as path-dependency, financial 
opportunities, and R&D explain backward integration.  
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Figure 5. Grape procurement and governance in Argentina: summary. 
Wine category Variable Lower tier 
(Basic) 
Middle tier 
(Premium) 
High-end 
Market Wine price range* < USD 5 USD 5-10 > USD 10 
Wine making Separate 
winemaking 
No No Yes 
Oak aging No 0 to 6 months 
(American/ 
French) 
12 to 18 months  
(French) 
Asset specificity Low Low Medium to High 
Grape production Grading E C and D A and B 
Varietal Criollas or 
International 
(blend) 
International International 
Yield Not limited (up 
to 30 tons/ha) 
Limited (10 to 
15 tons/ha) 
Very limited (5 to 
9 tons/ha) 
Bud density 15 to 25/meter 13 to 17/meter 10 to 13/meter 
Clusters density 2/bud 2/bud 1 to 1.5 /bud 
Asset specificity Low Low Medium 
(dedicated assets) 
Specific practices  No Little 
requirements, 
suggested 
practices 
Greater 
requirement (e.g. 
leaf and cluster 
thinning) 
Grape 
procurement 
Governance Market Market + 
Hierarchy 
Hierarchy + 
Hybrid 
Own vineyards** <10% 50% >70% 
Contracts Type No contract 
(spot) 
Complete 
contract 
Incomplete 
contract 
Verbal/Written n/a Verbal Verbal or written 
Duration No commitment One year, 
rolling 
One to five years 
Decision rights for 
the winery 
No + +++ 
Visits by winery 
field staff 
Unusual Once a month Frequent 
Pricing Market price 
(with public 
regulation) 
Market price 
and quality 
incentives 
Negotiated 
or fixed price/ha 
* Price per 75 cl. bottle. Buenos Aires, retail chains, 2010. 
 ** Our estimations based on Lumbroso (2010). 
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There is indeed a long history of vertical integration by wine producers in New World 
chains, both downstream into logistics and distribution, and upstream into grape 
production (Knox, 2000; Simpson, 2011). Nowadays, a stable mix between vertical 
integration and contract farming is a salient feature, not only in Argentina, but also in the 
Chilean, New-Zealand, Australian, South-African, and Californian premium wine-grape 
industries (Geraci, 2004; Gwynne, 2006; Lewis et al., 2001; Ponte, 2009). According to 
our interviews, in the case of BC, the need to protect brand name capital is nevertheless 
the most important, although not the only, motivation for developing vineyard ownership.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In Argentina, grape procurement for high-end wine brands is governed by a mix of 
corporate vineyards and agricultural contracts, allocating substantial decision rights to 
wineries with regards to the standards they require from their third-party growers. The 
comparative analysis of three wine segments within the same company confirms that 
contracting practices could be explained by the organisational problems faced by grape 
buyers. We also point out how incomplete contracts are completed ex-post in the industry, 
and how wineries and growers use enforcement devices to sustain their mutual 
understanding, while lowering transaction costs.  
We are aware of the shortcomings of the study. There is a need to investigate more deeply 
the question of pricing in incomplete wine-grape contracts. As Ménard (2012) argues, 
besides the ideas of "fair price", there has been little empirical investigation into the rent-
sharing rules of contracts without well-defined income rights. This presents a new avenue 
to be explored.  
There is also a need to study regulatory frameworks impacting governance structures and 
contract design (Oxley, 1999; Williamson, 2000). New World cases are interesting, and 
deserve further investigation, because contrary to European mature wine chains, grape 
transactions are not embedded in PDO regulation and other developed public or 
collective institutions (Raynaud et al., 2005; Lanotte and Traversac, 2011). Unlike Chile, 
where written contracts are used in the production of popular varietal wines (Martin, 
2003), written contracts in Mendoza are only employed for the high-end segment. Such a 
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difference may mean that the Argentinean legal system is less geared up to deal with 
contractual disputes relating to premium grapes. A consequence is that contractors have 
to invest more in reputation capital than their Chilean counterparts. This hypothesis 
would, of course, deserve further empirical investigation. 
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